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ABSTRACT
DWORKINIAN LIBERALISM, THE RIGHT TO PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE
INTERNET
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Westmoreland)

In a 1981 journal article, “Is There A Right to Pornography?,” Ronald Dworkin
argues that we have a right to ethical independence that includes the right to consume
pornography. The purpose of this thesis is to inquire as to whether Dworkinian liberalism
does entail a right to specifically internet pornography. This research is primarily focused
on Ronald Dworkin’s writings in Justice for Hedgehogs, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory
and Practice of Equality, and Taking Rights Seriously to describe the principles and
character of Dworkinian liberalism and its philosophical relationship to the question of
the right to pornography. This thesis considers contemporary pornography consumption
and its prevalence as it relates to the effects of internet technology on its availability.
Given the nature and the source of pornography’s influence upon the ethical landscape,
this thesis argues that contemporary pornography availability undermines the conditions
of dignity and that certain types of prohibition do not offend the right to ethical
independence.
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PREFACE
1. Background
Liberalism cannot meet the demands of equality, democracy, justice, or fairness
without a keen eye to the social and political effects of technological development, which
are rapidly changing the world. There is seemingly very little that has escaped
technology’s vast and transformative reach. As social media democratizes information,
government officials are subject to a limitless stream of public scrutiny, intensifying
representative accountability while simultaneously transforming the terms of normal
political engagement. Philosophical echo chambers abound as partisan disputes intensify.
Political groups purify as group membership ceases to be a matter of charitable debate,
practical cooperation, and good-faith compromise, and instead becomes finely-grained
ideological matchmaking. The capacity of technological forces to change the form and
content of human life cannot be overstated. Technological forces continuously affect and
change the people and communities that liberalism is charged with governing, raising
new issues about our ability to live good lives and personal freedom. Online cultures
proliferate continuously, providing anyone with internet access the opportunity to surveil
an endless selection of possible lifestyles, worldviews, aesthetics, and even ethics. As
Ralph Waldo Emerson once said, “Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind.”1

1

Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Ode, Inscribed to William H. Channing,” lines 50-51.
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Yet, liberal philosophers and political theorists have traditionally insisted that
these are the sorts of issues with which liberalism ought to be, generally speaking,
unconcerned. On this view, liberalism prioritizes questions of the right ahead that of the
good. The right concerns our obligations to others, whereas the good concerns what it
means to live a worthy life. Liberalism traditionally insists that the latter ought to not be
the state’s business, and liberals instead emphasize the importance of personal autonomy.
Hence, the sort of liberalism that puts a premium on personal autonomy insists that the
individual is the fundamental unit of political analysis, so to speak, and that we must
allow others to choose for themselves the lives they will lead, so long as they do not
violate the liberal rights of others; this is the essential characteristic of liberal political
philosophy. On this account, liberalism might appear to be unconcerned in principle with
the good precisely because it is concerned with protecting personal autonomy. Supposing
that the good lacks priority under liberalism, it will be left to individuals to define for
themselves what counts towards living a good life. On this conception of liberalism, the
state must abstain from attending to the good, from interfering in its citizens’ lives to
make their lives better. Most importantly, this sort of liberalism must abstain from
interfering with technological advances that threaten the possibility of living good life,
even when many people agree that a certain technological advance really is a threat to
living a good life.
But this sort of abstention is not necessarily desirable. The problem for this kind
of liberalism is that the real possibility of living a good life constitutes at least part of
what makes personal autonomy substantively important. As such, technology that
diminishes the possibility of living a good life must also be seen as threatening to
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personal autonomy. In this case, abstention by the state removes the real possibility of
choosing a good life, and therefore threatens personal autonomy. But choosing to attend
to the challenges to personal autonomy inherent in technological development is not the
same as a government forcing a particular way of life on its citizens. If liberalism insists
on utter insensitivity towards the good out of respect for the right, does it lose its claim to
be an attractive political philosophy? Ronald Dworkin insists that it does, and that if
liberal principles are valuable at all it is because they help make it possible for us to live
good lives without relieving us of the responsibility either of choosing the lives we live
or of respecting the independence of others. Preserving the conditions of living a good
life constitutes at least part of the conditions of preserving personal autonomy, so a
liberalism that insists on quietism about the good life must not be all that good after all.
Therefore, Dworkin thinks that liberals must take the good as seriously as they do the
right. Nonetheless, he thinks that people do have a right to view pornography, even if its
wide availability diminishes the possibility of an enriching sexual life. How, then, does a
Dworkinian liberalism, which claims to attend to the good and the right, justify such a
right if pornography use threatens the possibility of living a good life?

2. Aims
This thesis addresses the recently-old (or perhaps prudish) question of the right to
pornography, chosen because it is illustrative of a particular aspect of liberalism’s
troubling relationship with technology. The value (or disvalue) of pornography is a
highly controversial subject that divides people along all manner of ideological lines. The
religious conservative condemns pornography as sinful and degrading, while third-wave
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feminists disagree with second-wave feminists as to whether pornography can be
sexually liberating or is essentially oppressive. Some artists claim that pornography is an
expressive medium, as worthy as any other art form to be treated with consideration and
respect, while judges and legal philosophers fiercely debate whether pornography even
meets the legal standard for protected speech. Yet these are different kinds of claims. The
former set of these judgements are judgements about what behaviors are good or bad for
us – they are judgements made in response to questions about liberal goods, such as
“Does viewing pornography diminish the possibility of an enriching sexual life?”. On the
other hand, the latter are judgements are about what sort of obligations we have in how
we treat one another, and these judgements answer questions about liberal rights, such as
“Does pornography oppress women?”.
Though these judgements differ, both are deeply related to legal questions and,
perhaps unsurprisingly, the legal status of pornography is equally controversial. Its
consumption is restricted on much the same basis as alcohol and tobacco, and so viewing
pornography is, legally speaking, restricted to adults. Most urban, suburban, and rural
municipalities enact ordinances and codes restricting the sale, advertisement, and
availability of physical pornography, and yet only a few States have chosen to regulate its
production. Even the State legislatures that have settled the issue have done so
differently, and due to the essentially international scope of the internet, there is no one
set of laws or statutes that regulate the use or distribution of pornography across national
lines. A single instance of pornography can be produced in a State or country where it is
highly regulated and viewed in another State or country where it is unregulated, or
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perhaps even highly illegal, and vice versa. Even considered alone, the ambiguous legal
status of pornography should be cause for concern for legislators and philosophers alike.
Furthermore, pornography is illustrative of technology’s transformative power,
which has fundamentally changed the availability of pornography; what was once
available to purchase in featureless brick-and-mortar stores as a physical magazine or
video recording by of-age adults is now available online instantaneously in staggering
volumes, consisting of hundreds of genres of videos, available to anyone with a webenabled phone, computer, tablet, or gaming console – all without any effective form of
age verification. There are search engine filtering applications and browser monitoring
programs that enable parents and employers to block sexually explicit content, but this
requires downloading or, in the case of more powerful personal-use or business-use
programs, buying the program and effectively using it. For the concerned and
technologically-savvy parent, this is perhaps only a small burden to pay to protect one’s
children from exposure to adult content. But the point remains that, in most instances,
pornography is readily available to anyone with access to the internet, of which a
plurality are certainly children and teenagers. Certain internet browsers, like Google
Chrome, automatically hide sexually explicit content from search results unless the
search query is very precisely worded in order to prevent misspelled searches exposing
users to pornographic content, but this cannot prevent teenagers and children from
accessing pornographic content if they know what terms to search for, or how to spell a
pornographic web address correctly. It is difficult, therefore, to imagine that pornography
could be substantively more available than it already is.
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Most liberals would find it disturbing if not deeply upsetting if it were discovered
that a particular pornographic bookstore, though housed in a nondescript building lacking
obtrusive signage or advertisements and well outside municipal limits, was nonetheless
routinely allowing middle-schoolers to purchase and rent pornography merely because
the children managed to find the store. Undoubtedly, the nature of the internet itself
constitutes part of the problem of pornography. The internet was originally conceived as
an information superhighway without speed limits, where the motorists all agreed to
drive defensively, so to speak. The first users were assumed to be friendly, hence the
development of the internet was guided by the principle of ease-of-access. Data security
and rigorous identity verification are, in abstract, an unnecessary inconvenience between
a closed group of data scientists and vetted government employees. At the risk of
generalizing, it needs to be remembered that the internet is, at bottom, fundamentally a
physically connected system of wires. When considering the relationship between
pornography and the technology that facilitates its propagation, as long as pornography is
being produced and made available online, it will always be possible for an experienced
user, whether adult or not, to access some sort of pornography, even if it is illegal.
Nonetheless, liberals cannot count this fact as a reason to disregard the question of the
right to pornography. The necessity of the elimination of child pornography is, one would
hope, a settled question among self-avowed liberals, and yet that task is beset by the same
structural and conceptual difficulties as the elimination of garden-variety pornography.
As such, the question of the right to garden-variety pornography cannot be ignored by
appeal to the implicit difficulty of successfully regulating pornography access without
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risking moral and ethical hypocrisy. Such a question is a question of how the liberal
polity should conduct and govern itself, and such questions are always worth asking.
Given the increasing rapidity with which modern technology generally, and the
internet in particular, is transforming and not only the social relations that determine how
a society functions, but also the methods and practices of effective governance, the values
that color and shape popular culture, and the competing conceptions of ethics that make
up the political community, liberalism must take up the challenge of philosophically
accommodating and managing the effects technological development. According to
Dworkin, if liberalism must ignore the conditions of the possibility of a good life it does
not deserve to be taken seriously as a political philosophy. The liberal state can maintain
an environment in which people have the ability to choose good lives without prescribing
or endorsing a particular kind of life, and that kind of ethical maintenance advances
rather than undermines the core liberal value of autonomy. The question of what it means
to live an objectively good life, if it is a question with which liberalism ought to be
concerned, is a question that must be concerned with actual circumstances in which the
modern liberal finds himself: surrounded by technology, with a life to lead in a way that
suits him. It is this problem with which this thesis concerns itself. If it means protecting
the possibility of living a good life, can attractive conceptions of liberalism countenance
prohibiting online pornography?
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ETHICS, MORALITY, AND VALUE
In Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin states that an “ethical judgement
makes a claim about what people should do to live well; what they should aim to be and
achieve in their own lives.”2 Ethical questions are questions about the values that
someone thinks he ought to pursue, and these values in turn determine the character of his
conception of living a good life and how the good life is to be pursued. Ethics, then, is an
individual concern of each person. In contrast, moral inquiries investigate our
fundamental obligations to others. Moral judgements insist that it matters how we treat
one another, that we have duties to behave in a certain manner.
But why worry about ethical and moral questions? Why think that there are
objectively right answers to questions about what constitutes a good life and what we
owe one another? If there are not, then moral and ethical matters are reduced to matters
of subjective taste. Indeed, many people deny that there are objective answers to ethical
and moral questions because they think that whatever counts as ‘objectively true’ must in
principle be provable in terms of non-normative empirical facts. For example, on this
view, scientific propositions can be objectively true in virtue of their dependence upon
empirical observation, but there isn’t any ‘provable’ law of morality which demonstrates
that, for example, lying to your parents is objectively wrong. Related to this view is
Hume’s principle, which claims that you cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, that is,

2

Ronald Dworkin, Justice For Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 25.
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that normative claims cannot be justified by appeal to a set of empirical claims.
Supposing all the aforementioned, that the ‘world’ is made up exclusively of observable
empirical facts, that no set of collected empirical facts can produce a normative claim,
and that if something can be objectively true it must be provably objective in virtue of
empirical claims, it follows that it ethical and moral claims are not objective.
This is the subjectivity thesis, and this particular subjectivist view is popular
among different many kinds of people, but is it a convincing position? The subjective
view, Dworkin contends, inappropriately assumes that normative claims can only be true
if they are reducible to empirical claims or at least empirically provable, and accordingly
this position denies the possibility of the autonomy of ethical and moral claims. The
autonomy of ethical and moral claims is simply the idea that ethical and moral claims,
though not empirically provable, nonetheless are objectively true or false. If the
possibility of the autonomy of ethics and morality is left open, however, then one is free
to accept Hume’s principle without reducing important questions of value to matters of
mere taste.
Could objectivity be a bad thing according to liberalism? Some liberals, like
Richard Rorty, suggest that seeking objectivity in politics risks slipping into the exact sort
of autonomy-threatening paternalism that liberalism rejects. These liberals worry that
focusing on the purported ‘objectivity’ of normative claims presents a stumbling block to
agreement. Liberal governments are necessarily democratic in varying degrees; members
of liberal communities hold profoundly different beliefs about sexual freedom,
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reproductive rights, economic policy, the penal system, religious liberties, military
strategy, and foreign policy, not all of which are obviously reconcilable. As such, the
prospect of governing a liberal polity in accordance with purportedly ‘objective’ ethical
and moral values seems, at the very least, extremely daunting, and it might be supposed
that liberalism must therefore affect a ‘live and let live’ disposition. On this view,
liberalism requires a subjective view of moral and ethical values in order to govern
effectively and guard against paternalism.
Liberal concerns about objectivity in ethics and morality are distinct, however.
Governing in accordance with an objective conception of ethics means endorsing a
particular set of values as essential to living well and therefore judging those values as
better than others, and liberals worry that merely endorsing some conception of living
well risks the government imposing a particular kind of life upon its citizens. Indeed,
such an imposition would constitute an offense against personal autonomy, at least
facially. If ethical endorsement really risks ethical imposition, as many liberals suppose,
infringement against personal autonomy is certainly too high a price to pay for a
liberalism that embraces an objective conception of ethics. On this view,
acknowledgement of the objectivity of ethics raises the possibility of paternalism.
On the other hand, a liberalism that employs an objective conception of morality
in governance takes it to be objectively true that its citizens have certain obligations in
how they treat and interact with one another. Certain kinds of treatment are permissible,
others are objectively wrong; on one objective conception of liberal morality, it might be
morally permissible to protest a campaign rally whose candidate’s platform I vehemently
disagree with, even if it greatly offends others, but it might nonetheless be considered
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objectively wrong for me to protest someone’s senatorial candidacy by slashing their car
tires. The difference between the two kinds of protests might seem obvious in the
example given, but liberals genuinely worry that a regime that presupposes an objective
conception of morality might fail to fully recognize the scope of some genuine rights, or
perhaps fail to recognize certain rights at all. A regime that takes it to be the case that
objective morality prohibits intentionally disrespecting national symbols, for example,
would nonetheless fail to recognize that the genuine right to free speech might include the
right to burn one’s own national flag.
A liberalism that seeks to unilaterally accommodate every possible lifestyle and
morality should not be considered as a serious answer to the problem of diverse human
association. Liberalism cannot be, as William Galston says, “understood as an arena for
the unfettered expression of ‘difference’.”3 But this critique of the subjectivist position
does not prove that ethics and morality aren’t subjective. If they are, the goodness and
rightness of liberalism must be subjective as well. In this case, liberal governance
becomes an extremely illiberal question of choosing between an arbitrary imposition of
political and social order on the one hand, and total anarchy on the other. This is neither
an attractive nor particularly liberal conception of governance, but without a conceptual
explanation of objectivity of value judgements, liberals will have to settle.
Indeed, many people are initially attracted to liberalism because they are skeptical
of the idea that value judgements are objective, and the idea is certainly abroad that a
“who’s to say what’s right or wrong” skepticism is an essential characteristic of liberal
political philosophies. Is the subjectivity thesis mistaken? If what is in fact the ethical

3

Galston, William, Liberal Purposes: Goods Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3-4.
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way for me to live my life is merely the life I happen to want, then the putative
distinction between the subjective and objective in ethics vanishes. Ethical (and moral)
assertions are not claims of the sort that ‘correspond’ to some other feature of reality in
the way that we often think answers to questions of biology ‘correspond’ to the physical
world. Dworkin refers to such typically scientific inquiries as criterial and, situating
questions of value in contrast to criterial questions, classifies ethical and moral
judgements as interpretive, which most simply means the following: answers to questions
of ethics and morality are not given by criterial evaluations, evaluations which ask
whether our answers to certain kinds of questions correspond in a ‘one-to-one’ manner to
some feature of reality in a ‘verifiable’ and determinate way. Rather, interpretative
evaluations require that we investigate how our answers to, say, one particular subset of
ethical claims coheres with our other judgements about morality and what it means to live
well. Interpretive concepts in a sense ‘justify’ one another.
Hence, living a good life “cannot mean simply having whatever one in fact
wants”4 – that would be to reduce a normative ethical question to a merely empirical
question of one’s desires, a violation of Hume’s principle according to Dworkin. Ethics
cannot be a matter of my volitional interests, those things that I merely happen to desire
irrespective of the things I ought to desire. Instead, leading a good life must be defined by
one’s critical interests, “the interests we should have.”5 Normative inquiries that hope to
discover answers grounded in non-normative or physical entities begin in error.
According to Dworkin, the realm of value is so fundamentally different from the physical
world that ethical and moral inquiry must begin in interpretation rather than criterial

4
5

Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 195.
Ibid.
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analysis. In order to understand what Dworkin means by ‘interpretation,” one need only
look to the principle claim of Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs, that the realm of value is
unified. As Dworkin says:
The truth about living well and being good and what is wonderful is not only
coherent but mutually supporting: what we think about any one of these must
stand up, eventually, to any argument we find compelling about the rest. I try to
illustrate the unity of at least ethical and moral values: I describe a theory of what
living well is like and what, if we want to live well, we must do for, and not do to,
other people.6
Morality and ethics fix each other in such a manner that our answers in one realm should
support our answers in another, and it is in this sense that character of normative inquiry
ought to be understood as interpretive.
Furthermore, the answers we seek in the realm of value cannot be treated other
than as if they are objective. For Dworkin, the reply that value must be subjective
because it ultimately proceeds from an autonomous human will, or because “only
naturalistic explanations are competent to explain why people hold the convictions they
do,”7 or because of any kind of skepticism which a priori denies the existence or
objectivity of any and all values, is categorically insufficient because “it does not redeem
the phenomenology that inspires it.”8 On Dworkin’s account, we are bound by a
responsibility to live in accordance with our ethical obligations because the explanation
of the existence of such a responsibility is phenomenologically irresistible. A special
human aspiration exists to live a life that is critically good, and this normative ambition
demands interpretive explanation. As Dworkin says:
We are self-conscious animals who have drives, instincts, tastes, and preferences.
There is no mystery why we should want to satisfy those drives and serve those
6

Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 214.
8
Ibid.
7
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tastes. But it can seem mysterious why we should want a life that is good in a
more critical sense: a life we can take pride in having lived when the drives are
slaked or even if they are not. We can explain this ambition only when we
recognize that we have a responsibility to live well and believe that living well
means creating a life that is not simply pleasurable but good in that critical way.9
This is not to say that questions of ethics and morality have clear or obvious
answers, nor to suggest that Dworkin thinks that ethical and moral judgements are
subjective at the individual, or even the group level. He firmly asserts that all normative
claims are objectively true or false; value judgements are value judgements all the way
down, so to speak. To search for an empirical foundation for an ethical or moral inquiry
is to mistakenly suppose from the outset that ethical and moral concepts are criterial
rather than interpretive, and Dworkin is not a value skeptic or relativist. In Justice for
Hedgehogs, he says:
That there are truths about value is an obvious, inescapable fact. When people
have decisions to make, the question of what decision they should make is
inescapable, and it can be answered only by noticing reasons for acting one way
or another. No doubt the best answer on some occasions is that nothing is any
better to do than anything else. Some unfortunate people find a more dramatic
answer unavoidable: they think nothing is ever the best or right thing to do. But
these are as much substantive, first-order, value judgements about what to do as
are more positive answers. They draw on the same kinds of arguments, and they
claim truth in just the same way.10
More particularly, as he lays out later in Justice For Hedgehogs, Dworkin contends that
external moral skepticism is flatly self-contradictory and insufficient to explain the way
we experience value. External moral skepticism denies the possibility of any objective
answer to questions of value. Internal moral skepticism, on the other hand, might deny
objectivity of certain normative judgements or that a certain objective judgement is
correct, but does not deny the objectivity of value writ large. The view that values must

9

Ibid., 196.
Ibid., 24 (emphasis added).
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be subjective because there are no metaphysical objects which correspond to those values
fails because, on Dworkin’s view, “We cannot escape, in how we think, an assumption
that value exists independent of our will or fiat.”11 It is not necessary to lay out that
argument in its fullness here. For now, what is important about that argument is that
Dworkin’s conception of liberalism is categorically realist about ethical and moral values,
particularly liberal ones, and that Dworkin believes that any attractive conception of
liberalism will be categorically realist about value. Furthermore, Dworkin insists that
‘external’ conceptions of value, i.e. claims about the metaphysical or empirical
foundation of normative value, add nothing to the objective character of morality and
ethics, and so the absence of any such foundation does not detract from the objectivity of
value. He insists that people really ought to honor their moral and ethical obligations,
even when they do not in fact do so, or when they deny having such obligations. The
objective character of morality and ethics is not a ‘special’ or second-rate kind of
objectivity; the objectivity of value is just as robust as any other kind of objectivity,
whether scientific or otherwise. Dworkin claims that any liberalism that does not assume
the objectivity of value is inherently self-defeating, since liberalism itself is a grand thesis
about what is in fact right.
And so, when a liberal government makes it illegal to drive at seventy-five miles
an hour through a school zone, the law is not an expression of brute preference. Speed
limits and traffic laws implicitly claim to create objectively justifiable obligations.
Liberal justice, then, is not enforcing the majority’s merely subjective preference for
certain rules; liberal morality must be objective. In the same way, ethical matters cannot

11

Ibid., 214.
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be equated to questions of whether one prefers rocky road ice cream to vanilla swirl, for
we “cannot explain the importance of a good life except by noticing how creating a good
life contributes to living well.”12 If liberalism takes morality to be objective, then ethical
matters must be considered as objective as well. In the same way that liberalism cannot
emphasize the value of personal autonomy as distinct from the possibility it creates for
living well, liberalism cannot dispense with objective conceptions of morality or ethics.
Dworkinian liberalism is a fully comprehensive liberalism beyond a merely
political comprehensive liberalism, to apply the Rawlsian distinction. His liberalism is
not skeptical towards the fundamental answers to questions of ethics and morality which
ordinary people inquire of themselves in their everyday lives. If Dworkinian liberalism
were not fully comprehensive, the question of whether or it would be justifiable and
rightly enforceable to ban pornography would, by all plausible accounts, be clearly
beyond the pale. But Dworkin’s liberalism is comprehensive, and he thinks that there are
objective ethical truths, one of which might be that pornography is bad. Yet, many liberal
philosophers, Dworkin included, assert that unless it can be shown that pornography
consumption causes rape, domestic violence, or some plainly morally abhorrent
consequence, banning pornography constitutes a tyrannical, paternalistic, and damnable
moral offense against the members of the liberal community. Furthermore, they also deny
that such a relationship between pornography and the aforementioned offenses can be
shown; if such a causal relationship could be demonstrated, banning pornography would
be within the bounds of non-Dworkinian, less-comprehensive liberalisms. As of now
such a relationship has not been demonstrated. However, Dworkin is adamant in asserting

12

Ibid., 196.

21

that the answers we seek in ethics can be objectively correct and that objectivity in ethics
does not threaten liberal rights. Liberalism, he thinks, cannot make sense of the right
without a theory of the good that explains the importance of personal autonomy. As such,
the question of the right to pornography is perfectly within the bounds of consideration
under a fully Dworkinian liberalism.

22

DIGNITY
Seeking to find an integrated “conception of morality that can guide our
interpretation of living well,”13 Dworkin separates general ethical inquiries into two kinds
of questions: what it means to live well, and what constitutes a good life. Living well is a
matter of rising to a challenge, a charge given “by the bare fact of our existence as selfconscious creatures with lives to lead.”14 For Dworkin, living well has value independent
of its consequences. Having a good life, on the other hand, depends upon one’s particular
historical, financial, and social circumstance, as well as what philosophers call ‘moral’
and ‘ethical luck’ A political leader who achieves worldwide recognition and admiration,
who lives a life full of diverse and elevated experiences, but who gained his status
through lying, deceit, and treachery would have lived a good life but not a life lived well.
Dworkin thinks that part of living well is striving for a good life, but that a life may be
lived well even if lived through unfortunate circumstances and bad luck: a bad life lived
well. Furthermore, he asserts that “living well is not the same as maximizing the chance
of producing the best possible life.”15 Dworkin contends that it is living well, rather than
having a good life, which gives our lives ethical meaning.
Dworkin locates the particular aspect of living well that achieves an interpretive
integration between ethics and morality in two principles, the principles of self-respect

13

Ibid., 193.
Ibid., 196.
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Ibid., 199.
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and authenticity. The principle of self-respect states that “each person must take his own
life seriously: he must accept that it is a matter of importance that his life be a successful
performance rather than a wasted opportunity.”16 Self-respect requires that I recognize
that my life matters and that it matters objectively with general, rather than special,
importance. That is to say, self-respect requires that you recognize that none of the
special features of your life, whether career success, marital fulfillment, profound artistic
achievement, or otherwise, can produce, affect, or even diminish the value and
importance of your life. The principle of self-respect requires that we recognize that our
lives matter objectively even if we end up living bad lives. On the other hand, the
principle of authenticity states that “each person has a special, personal responsibility for
identifying what counts as success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility to
create that life through a coherent narrative or style that he himself endorses.”17 There is,
therefore, an aspect of Dworkinian ethics that is deontological, for it objectively matters
that each person take his own life seriously and make a sincere attempt to live it well
irrespective of whether or not someone thinks that it matters that they do so.
These two principles state the fundamental requirements of living well and are
joined in Dworkin’s interpretive concept of dignity. A life lived well is a life lived with
dignity; the two are equivalent. Furthermore, the objective character of the two principles
of dignity stipulate that each person recognize that it objectively matters that others live
with dignity as well, that we have an obligation to others to not inhibit them from being
able to define their own lives as they see fit. Self-respect requires that I recognize the
general importance of my life, and the objective character of this recognition implies

16
17

Ibid., 203.
Ibid., 204.
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everyone else’s lives are equally as generally important as mine. Authenticity requires
that I take personal responsibility for living well, and the objective character of this
responsibility implies that others have such a responsibility as well. Dignity, then,
grounds the interpretive unity between ethics and morality. Because it objectively matters
that each person lives a life of dignity, it objectively matters that others live a life of
dignity as well. In dignity, the good meets the right at the political level as well, as the
objective importance of living well means that the members of a political community
have objective obligations not to hinder other people’s capacity to live well in certain
ways.
A word must be said about the particular requirements of authenticity, as it will be
relevant to our consideration of the pornography question later. Self-respect requires
taking oneself seriously, and so living authentically “means expressing yourself in your
life, seeking to live in a way that grips you as right for you and your circumstance,”18 and
those expressions are no less authentic because they are “so severely constrained that
only limited choices are available.”19 Living well, then, is sensitive to limitations
imposed by historical and social circumstance. Hence authenticity is a kind of
independence, a recognition that what makes a life valuable is not living a life defined by
opposition to or conformity with any particular social or political worldview, but that
living well requires living in response to “your situation and the values you find
appropriate.”20
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The most important aspect of our consideration of banning pornography lies what
Dworkin calls ethical independence, the aspect of authenticity which stipulates “what
dignity demands we try to establish in our relations with other people.”21 Dworkin says:
We all live in an ethical culture that provides, at any time, the palette of
recognizable ethical values from which possibilities can be drawn. We rearrange
conventional priorities among those values – we can become people of brute
honesty instead of tact – and we can cleave to personal values that others disdain,
like sexual abstinence.22
Happenstance limitations imposed on the range of ethical lifestyles available to us by
culture or society, then, cannot constitute an offense against authenticity, and therefore
they do not constitute an offense against dignity. The widespread technological
dependence may make living as a devoted Luddite extremely difficult, perhaps even
impossible. Nonetheless, a person suffers no offense against his dignity when he cannot
travel the highways by horse and buggy.
So Dworkin says, “We cannot escape influence, but we must resist domination.”23
When a person’s ability to live authentically - to live in a state of ethical independence is not limited by cultural circumstances but rather is actively forbidden by a person or
party, that constitutes a fundamental offense against his dignity because “he is made to
accept someone else’s judgement in place of his own about the values or goals his life
should display.”24 Because living well requires that we see our ability to define our own
lives as a matter of objective importance and therefore that it also matters that others be
permitted to do so as well, forcing someone to adopt a set of ethical values with which he
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does not identify is not merely to treat him immorally, it violates a fundamental right.
Dworkin continues:
On the other hand he does not live authentically, no matter how great the range of
options he is offered, if others forbid him some options otherwise available
because they deem those options unworthy. The indignity lies in usurpation, not
limitation. Authenticity demands that, so far as decisions are to be made about the
best use to which a person’s life should be put, these must be made by the person
whose life it is.25
The decision as to what ethical values we ascribe to our own lives must emerge from a
conviction derived from self-respect authentically, irrespective of social pressures or
political coercion. Because Dworkin grounds the fundamental value of a life in living
with dignity, and because dignity serves as the interpretive conjunction of our distinct
ethical and moral concepts, dignity serves as the foundation of both Dworkin’s
conceptions of political legitimacy and of rights. What, then, is the functional difference
between domination and mere limitation? Under Dworkinian liberalism, is it necessarily
the case that prohibiting pornography counts as an illegitimate act of domination if it
cannot be shown that viewing pornography causes rape or sexual violence? On the other
hand, is it only ‘mere limitation’ if cultural forces conspire in such a way as to make
viewing pornography both pervasive and irresistible to many people? If pornography
were prohibited by reason of the latter case, would it necessarily constitute domination,
or is a liberal political community sometimes justified in prohibiting what it earnestly
understands as a threat to the very possibility of having an enriching sexual life?
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EQUAL CONCERN, DWORKIN’S THEORY OF RIGHTS, AND
JUSTIFICATION
As it relates to the question of pornography, Dworkinian liberalism is
comprehensive in two closely-related senses. Firstly, it is comprehensive because it
asserts that liberal goods are good because they are good in themselves objectively
speaking. Liberty, democracy, equality, and autonomy are not conceptually useful means
to some ‘more pragmatic’ social end, they are objective values to be recognized as such.
Secondly, Dworkinian liberalism is comprehensive in theoretical scope, seeking an
interpretive integration between our most fundamental ethical and moral commitments on
the one hand and liberal political values on the other. Insofar as consideration of the
question of a moral right to pornography is a question of value, it must be answered
interpretively. The best answer will cohere with Dworkinian liberalism’s other value
judgements. Particularly, it must endorse Dworkin’s normative conception of dignity and
a robust conception of living well.
Do liberal rights and the principle of political legitimacy rule out prohibiting
pornography? What constitutes true political legitimacy? What standard of justification
must be met such that a certain policy or law is properly said to be legitimate within a
fully-Dworkinian liberalism? As Dworkin explains in Sovereign Virtue, equal concern is
the “precondition of political legitimacy”26 that justifies the claim of the democratic
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majority of the right to enforce its laws against the minority. The principle of equal
concern is a moral principle, for it makes a normative claim about how a liberal
government must treat its citizens, and this principle occupies a particularly powerful
position in Dworkin’s liberal schema. From the perspective of governance, the principle
of equal concern separates issues that are permissibly on the political agenda from those
that are excluded as a matter of principle; it determines what laws officials must not even
consider. If prohibiting pornography categorically fails to show equal concern, it is
morally unjustifiable for a Dworkinian liberal community to enforce against its members.
On Dworkin’s account, the principle of equal concern entails that members of a
liberal community have a claim to a certain kind of treatment. The character of the
treatment to which they are entitled is defined by liberalism’s commitment to the ideal of
ethical individualism, which is “fundamental to any comprehensive liberal political
theory.”27 There are two principles which constitute ethical individualism: the principle
of equal importance and the principle of special responsibility. The principle of equal
importance claims that “It is important, from an objective point of view, that human lives
be successful rather than wasted, and this is equally important, from an objective point of
view, for each human life.”28 This first principle is a reflection of Dworkin’s concept of
self-respect, which takes it to be a matter of general, rather than special, importance that
each person value his life as objectively valuable. The principle of equal importance, as
differentiated from self-respect, requires that liberal lawmaking and governance regard
the success of human life as a matter of objective importance. A law that distinguishes
between persons on the principle that some kind of people matter less than others, or
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because the majority despises their way of life, by reason of plainly violating of the
principle of equal importance, is politically illegitimate. The second principle of ethical
individualism is the principle of special responsibility. This principle claims that to
whatever degree cultural forces permit, if someone has an ethical choice to make about
the life he thinks he should lead, it is that person’s sole responsibility to make that choice
rather than someone else’s. A law that arbitrarily forbids public membership in a certain
religious denomination fails to show equal concern, and is therefore illegitimate, because
it implicitly denies the special responsibility of religious practitioners to inhabit a belief
system that strikes them as correct. In this way, the principle of special responsibility
mirrors Dworkin’s conception of authenticity in the same way that self-respect mirrors
the principle of equal importance. Authenticity requires that each person identify what
counts as success or failure in his own life, and the principle of special responsibility
requires that a liberal government’s laws and policies recognize that each person does
have such a responsibility to authenticity.
These two principles establish that liberal governments must take up the task of
making its laws and policies insensitive, as far as possible, to who people are, for
“morality must be treated as prior to ethics in politics.”29 A liberal community cannot, for
example, forbid someone from pursuing the life of a professional minigolfer simply
because they judge that miniature versions of regular sports are intrinsically worthless,
but in the same way, professional minigolfers are not owed additional government
income simply because mini-golf happens to be less lucrative profession than its regularsized counterpart. Dworkinian laws are sensitive to people's’ choices in virtue of the fact
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that they stipulate how must people treat one another rather than the kind of lives they
should lead. The principle of equal concern permits liberal communities to generally
regulate behavior that morally threatens other people’s ability to live well, but it strictly
forbids liberal communities from enforcing individual conceptions of ethics through law.
But, Dworkinian liberalism is not silent on all ethical matters, for it completely
endorses the objective goodness of liberal values against illiberal values, and these values
are inseparable from the importance of striving to live a good life. Dignity has objective
ethical value and recognizing that fact contributes to living a good life; one depends upon
the other. If someone fails to recognize the objective importance of living well, it should
be considered a highly lamentable ethical failure; yet this fact alone cannot justify a
liberal government taking corrective measures to ensure that the demands of ethical
individualism are met in each of its citizens’ lives. As a general rule, liberal governments
rightly regulate behavior that morally offends against dignity in virtue of treating certain
people as if they matter less than others. But, insofar as lifestyles that do not violate the
liberal rights of others are concerned, Dworkinian liberals must refrain from prioritizing
or endorsing certain ethical conceptions as being better or more desirable than others. It is
in this sense that laws which endorse a certain conception of ethics are wrongly “sensitive
to who people are.” A law that provides that only Protestant churches will be considered
tax-exempt because “Catholicism is wrong” would be a law that is wrongly sensitive in
this manner, for it prefers one kind of religion to another as an ethical judgement.
Because Dworkin’s conception of liberalism is thoroughly comprehensive, the
principles that constitute this ideal of ethical individualism must necessarily be “located
in a more general account of the humane values of ethics and morality, of the status and

31

integrity of value, and of the possibility of objective truth.”30 Ethical individualism must
be liberalism’s answer to the “challenge of equal concern,”31 and it must interpretively
cohere with our other ethical and moral commitments in such a way that they reinforce
one another. The two principles of ethical individualism mirror the two principles that
define Dworkin’s concept of dignity, authenticity and self-respect. The principles of
equal importance and special responsibility establish a moral threshold that differentiates
between policies that fail to show equal concern and those that do not. In this sense,
showing equal concern and respecting dignity are two sides of the same coin. As
individuals, we are obliged to respect the dignity of others, to not interfere with someone
else’s meeting the demands of authenticity and self-respect, of recognizing both the
importance and the value of having a life to lead. As citizens, we are permitted to
severely criticize the kinds of lives and values we find unworthy, but the obligations of
equal concern stand even if we are objectively correct in claiming that a certain kind life
is a terribly undesirable one. As a lawmaking liberal political community, we are obliged
to legislate in accordance with the demands of equal concern. With respect to the
question of whether or not a certain law fails to show equal concern, all that needs to be
asked is whether the law constitutes an offense against the dignity of those whom it
claims authority to govern. Under Dworkinian liberalism, the final test of political
legitimacy is found in dignity, for to show equal concern is simply to respect human
dignity in governance.
Dworkinian-liberal governments must show equal concern in governance, which
essentially entails respecting dignity. But Dworkinian liberalism is also robustly
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democratic; a liberal government can permissibly pursue many goals other than
protecting a political environment in which people can live well. The obligation to show
equal concern in governance is an obligation upon the democratic majority to respect the
dignity of those it is tasked with governing, and when dignity is not threatened, the goals
of the majority can rightly prevail. Hence liberal governments can pursue many different
kinds of goals even when the democratic minority objects. As Dworkin says in Taking
Rights Seriously:
The bulk of the law – that part which defines and implements social, economic,
and foreign policy – cannot be neutral. It must state, in its greatest part, the
majority’s view of the common good. The institution of rights is therefore crucial,
because it represents the majority’s promise to the minorities that their dignity and
equality will be respected. When the divisions among the groups are most violent,
then this gesture, if law is to work, must be most sincere.32
It might be highly controversial that a majority of townsfolk support installing paid
parking meters around their parking-space-starved town square to fund the construction
of a large parking garage, but no one’s rights are violated when they are required to pay
just as much as anyone else to park on the square, because no one is made to accept
someone else’s conception of living well because he has pay for a parking spot. It is only
when the majority has failed to show equal concern in governance that someone has a
moral claim against the majority of being treated without respect to their dignity. Equal
concern is not met, and so the justification of the majority’s preferences in law and
policy-making is insufficient, and it is in this sense that someone is said to possess a
‘right’ against his Dworkinian-liberal government.
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Dworkinian rights, then, are rights to a particular kind of treatment. This is
precisely the function of rights, for “Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a
collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as
individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or
injury upon them.”33 Dworkin distinguishes two kinds of rights. There are background
rights, which are fundamental rights “held in an abstract way against decisions taken by
the community or the society as a whole”34 that intrinsically demand equal concern, and
institutional rights, which are “rights that hold against a decision made by a specific
institution.”35 Institutional rights necessarily must not violate background rights, and in
many cases institutional rights will exist independently of any more fundamental
background right. The character of background rights makes them lexically prior to
institutional rights, though certain rights may be instances of both kinds, where particular
institutional iteration of the right is also an expression of a more general moral principle
that describes how the political community must treat its members. I have a constitutional
right to a trial by a jury of my peers, a legal right to a certain kind of treatment from the
justice system as an institution, but that right is also an expression of the liberal principle
of self-governance, which derives from the principle of dignity as a background right that
asserts that people should have a say in how they are governed. Under Dworkinian
liberalism, if it can be said that someone possesses a background right to something in the
aforementioned sense, then failure to fulfill this obligation constitutes an offense against
his dignity that entails the law or policy in question is morally illegitimate.

33

Ibid., xi.
Ibid., xii.
35
Ibid.
34

34

There are many philosophical implications of this conception of rights, the most
pertinent to the question of pornography being that rights are possessed by individuals,
not groups or collective entities. An argument against the existence of a right to
pornography which claims that the community has a right to have its ethical standards
enforced fails from the start, for Dworkin rejects the argument that a community can
possess rights in the same way as an individual. Such arguments rely incorrectly on a
kind of conceptual anthropomorphism that “supposes that a communal life is the life of
an outsize person, that it has the same shape, encounters the same moral and ethical
watersheds and dilemmas, and is subject to the same standards of success and failure as
the several lives of the citizens who make it up.”36 I will return to this particular aspect of
Dworkin’s theory of rights later, but it is worth emphasizing the following: when
considering the question of whether the majority’s political goals fail to show equal
concern, a lot turns on that goal’s justification.
Dworkin’s theory of rights acknowledges two kinds of rights: background and
institutional. The right to pornography, if it exists under Dworkinian liberalism, is an
instance of the former kind of right. Such a right might also become an institutional right
if, for example, that right is expressed formally in a legislative act, but for the purposes of
this thesis, the question of the existence of a right to pornography must be a question of
whether prohibiting pornography would constitute failure to show equal concern. If
prohibiting pornography necessarily fails to show equal concern, it follows individuals
possess a right to consume it, even if it goes against the majority’s conception of sexual
ethics, for “a right against the government must be a right to do something even when the
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majority thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse
off for having it done”37 even objectively speaking. Hence, background rights are rights
in the strongest sense: they are moral rights held in virtue of the demands of dignity, such
that someone possesses a background right whenever the justification for the majority’s
political goals is insufficient because it fails to show equal concern.
Still, it might be said that political majorities nonetheless have a stronger claim to
having their preferences fulfilled, that all other things being equal, it is objectively better
when more rather than fewer people have their moral and ethical preferences reflected in
the laws that govern their communities. This felicific argument appeals to the positive
ethical value of succeeding in living in accordance with your own ethical ideals. If it is
better, objectively speaking, when more people succeed in living well than when they
fail, it follows that in cases that require arbitrating between apparently conflicting
background rights, a political majority does well to support the critical interests of the
greatest number of people. This utilitarian argument parallels the earlier mentioned
‘collective will’ argument, but it fails for a different reason. Whether or not an individual
succeeds in living well, it is of no additional ethical value that his value preferences
happened to be shared by a political majority. Political majorities are not individual
persons with a responsibility to live well, and so they cannot ‘succeed’ or ‘fail’ to live
well. When different conceptions of background rights conflict with the majority’s goals,
We must recognize as competing rights only the rights of other members of
society as individuals. We must distinguish the ‘rights’ of the majority as such,
which cannot count as a justification for overruling individual rights, and the
personal rights of the members of the majority, which might well count.38
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The concept of background rights captures the difference between moral and
institutional obligations, and the interpretive character of Dworkin’s conception of
background rights implies that there might be one or more plausible answers to the
question of the right to pornography, all things interpretively considered. As will be seen
in the next section, whether equal concern entails that people have a background right to
pornography depends significantly on how a political majority justifies its preference for
prohibition, and whether a political majority’s preferences can permissibly be enforced is
a question about what kinds of justification fail to show equal concern. There might be
multiple reasons for prohibiting online pornography that do not violate the requirement of
equal concern. In this respect, the scope and aims of this thesis make it necessary to make
a choice about the conceptual justification of a right to pornography within Dworkin’s
broader scheme of rights, if only to select the strongest argument in favor of the right to
pornography. In this regard, this thesis follows Dworkin’s interpretive project.
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THE RIGHT TO ETHICAL INDEPENDENCE, FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES, AND
PUBLIC DISPLAY
In a 1981 article “Is There A Moral Right to Pornography,’ Dworkin suggests that the
right to view pornography might be found in a more general right to ‘moral
independence,’ which “is to be justified as a trump over an unrestricted utilitarian defense
of prohibitory laws against pornography, in a community of those who find offense just
in the idea that their neighbors are reading dirty books.”39 At that time, Dworkin had not
yet adopted the conceptual ethics/morality distinction that appears in his later works. In
this instance, the word ‘moral’ should not be taken to mean the same thing as ‘moral’ in
his later works, which concerns what dignity stipulates we owe other people in our
interactions with them. Here, the ‘independence’ in the right to ‘moral independence’
should be understood as a right to an ethical independence. The right to ethical
independence is founded by the second principle of dignity, authenticity, which stipulates
“what dignity demands we try to establish in our relations with other people,”40 namely
independence. Someone suffers an indignity whenever he is “made to accept someone
else’s judgement in place of his own about the values or goals his life should display,”41
which certainly includes judgements enforced through the law.
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An earlier argument this thesis considered, that a political majority deserves to have
its preferences fulfilled in virtue of its being a majority, offends against the right to
ethical independence in this manner. Banning pornography on the justification that a
majority of people find it offensive ignores the special individual demands of ethics, that
ethical value of a life is a matter of rising to a challenge as an individual. Ethical
independence means that the individual right to live in accordance with one’s own
conception of the good trumps the individual ethical preferences of the majority. On the
other hand, this right also implies that a political community may prohibit certain
activities and behaviors which it believes directly threatens ethical independence, which
is not the same as prohibiting something simply because the majority dislikes it. Although
equal concern forbids a political majority from enforcing its ethical preferences through
law, Dworkin claims that a liberal community may regulate the ethical impact of certain
types of behaviors as their “numbers and tastes justify,”42 and that restrictions on the
public display of “potentially offensive acts to special or private places”43 are consistent
with liberal justice.
Under Dworkinian liberalism, there are two instances in which someone has a right to
ethical independence against the government. The first instance in which someone
possesses a right to ethical independence does not depend on how the majority justifies
its relevant political goals. In this case, someone has a right to ethical independence when
political goals threaten an essential condition of authenticity, regardless of the given
justification. Dworkin refers to such cases as being matters of foundational importance,
and laws that offend ethical independence in a foundational way “deny people the power
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to make their own decisions about matters of ethical foundation – about the basis and
character of the objective importance of human life that the first principle of dignity
declares.”44 On this view, governments that refuse to allow gay people to get married
violate the right to ethical independence because choosing whom to marry is a
foundationally important decision. In such matters, utilitarian justifications for political
goals are categorically insufficient, and so matters of foundational importance necessarily
imply a right to ethical independence against the government, which “may not constrain
foundational independence for any reason except when this is necessary to protect the
life, security, or liberty of others.”45
The second instance, as has been hinted, occurs whenever the most plausible
justification for the majority’s preferences depends on an ethical, rather than moral,
judgement. Political decisions of this sort offend authenticity “in virtue, not of the
foundational character of the decisions they inhibit, but rather of government’s motives in
enacting those laws.”46 In the second case, the right to ethical independence can be
interpreted to protect a wide range of different behaviors and actions, and whether or not
a certain law or policy depends upon an ethical judgement that fails to show equal
concern is not always obvious. Assuming that the decision to purchase an AK-47 is not
foundationally important, a law prohibiting citizens from purchasing AK-47’s and similar
automatic rifles might depend upon a judgement that those who own them wrongly
glorify violence, but there are other plausible justifications for prohibiting assault rifles
that do not depend upon an ethical judgement. Instead, the political community might
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claim that banning assault rifles decreases the overall rate of violent gun crime, refraining
from passing ethical judgement on would-be assault rifle owners. In the latter case, the
majority’s justification assumes no ethical judgement, therefore the right to ethical
independence is not implied when a liberal community decides to ban ownership of
assault rifles. In the former case, however, the explicit justification depends upon an
ethical judgement that offends authenticity, and in such a case a member of the political
minority possesses a right to ethical independence against the policy or law, even if the
ability to own an assault rifle is objectively not foundationally important.
Are there good reasons, then, to think that viewing porn is a foundational issue, that
prohibiting it necessarily denies “people the power to make their own decisions about
matters of ethical foundation – about the basis and character of the objective importance
of human life that the first principle of dignity declares”?47 And, if it turns out to be
implausible that dignity is foundationally threatened when pornography access is
curtailed, does a plausible justification exist for prohibiting pornography that does not
depend on an illegitimate ethical judgement? If viewing pornography is foundationally
important, and therefore included in the right to ethical individualism, it can only be
overcome by another foundationally important issue, i.e. if it is “necessary to protect the
life, security, or liberty of others.”48 On the other hand, if viewing pornography is not
foundational, then it is politically possible for a liberal government to ban pornography,
so long as the apparent justification does not depend upon an ethical judgement. That is,
certain prohibitions against pornography does not fail to show equal concern when the
“matter is not foundational, and government’s constraint assumes no ethical
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justification.”49 Does Ronald Dworkin consistently adhere to the view that legal
restriction of pornography must not depend upon an ethical judgement?
In any case, the question of whether a Dworkinian liberal government is justified in
prohibiting pornography should not begin and end by considering whether, in the
abstract, the right to consume pornography is foundationally important. Beyond what is
“necessary to protect the life, security, or liberty of others,”50 Dworkin thinks that
“Which other decisions are also foundational, if any, is open to dispute.”51 Surveying
Dworkin’s comments on pornography, it is clear that at the very least Dworkin finds it
implausible to conceive of the ability to view pornography as foundationally important.
Dworkin asserts that the most plausible justification for prohibition nonetheless depends
upon an ethical judgement that “some peoples' conception of what sexual experience
should be like, and of what part fantasy should play in that experience, and of what the
character of that fantasy should be, are inherently degrading or unwholesome.”52
What, then, according to Dworkin, justifies a liberal community limiting the right to
view pornography by degree? Dworkin rejects the claim that a “community or any
individual is better off with more pornography rather than less,”53 and therefore asserts
“No one is denied an equal voice in the political process, however broadly conceived,
when he is forbidden to circulate photographs of genitals to the public at large.”54 On this
account, certain restrictions on access to pornographic material are at least politically
possible. From Dworkin’s perspective, then, certain kinds of restriction on pornography
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access do not offend the dignity of those who consume pornography, nor of those who
would prefer it to be publicly displayed. Is this a contradiction? The former claim is
certainly an ethical judgment about whether viewing pornography contributes to living
well, and it is the judgement that it doesn’t. But Dworkin firmly asserts that insofar as the
political majority’s motivations for prohibiting pornography are “preferences about how
others should behave,”55 the right to ethical independence “is to be justified as a trump
over…prohibitory laws against pornography.”56
But this apparent contradiction arises when we inappropriately assume that ethical
judgements necessarily express “preferences about how others should behave” in a way
that threatens ethical independence. On the contrary, insofar as a political majority’s
preferences “emphasize not how others should lead their lives, but rather the character of
the sexual experience people want for themselves,”57 Dworkin asserts that the right to
ethical independence actually recommends a compromise that “allows restrictions on
public display.”58 If the right to ethical independence entails a “prophylactic refusal to
count any motive whenever we cannot be sure that that motive is unmixed with
moralism,”59 the preconditions of political legitimacy under Dworkinian liberalism
become “unnecessarily inhospitable to the special and important ambitions of those who
then lose control of a crucial aspect of their own self-development.”60 The importance of
the right to ethical independence in sexual matters cannot be understood without
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recognizing how substantive ethical independence in sexual matters contributes to living
well.
The principles of Dworkinian liberalism therefore recognize the essential
difference between proscribing a specific conception of sexual ethics through law and
restricting what a liberal community believes diminishes their ability to respond to a
judgement of ethical value in sexual matters. From a political perspective, prohibition and
restriction are not morally equivalent. Prohibition almost certainly depends on an ethical
judgement that clearly offends our right to ethical independence. Restriction, on the other
hand, depends upon an ethical judgement, but not an ethical judgement that expresses
“preferences about how others should behave.” In this respect Dworkin asserts that this
justification for restriction, though an ethical judgement, does not inherently offend the
right to ethical independence. Hence, if viewing pornography is not foundationally
important, it is politically possible for a Dworkinian liberal community to restrict access
to pornography by prohibiting public display. Dworkinian liberalism is therefore open to
pornography restrictions based on these particular kinds of ethical judgments, and it
stands to reason that it is open to similarly justified restrictions on pornography access as
well.
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PORNOGRAPHY, ENDORSEMENT, AND THE INTERNET
Since Dworkin wrote “Is There A Moral Right to Pornography?” in 1981, the
manner in which people view pornography has changed dramatically. With the advent of
the internet, pornographic magazine subscriptions and adult video stores have been
replaced as the primary suppliers of pornographic material. Nowadays, pornography is
primarily obtained through online streaming services, which are accessible from nearly
every phone, laptop, desktop, gaming console, tablet, and TV with an internet connection
and a web browser. As such, it stands to reason that Dworkinian arguments favoring
prohibition on public display of pornography might support prohibiting online
pornography in light of a fundamental technological shift in the way people view
pornography. The internet did not exist when Dworkin originally addressed the question
of the right to view pornography, and comments on the subject in his later works give no
indication that Dworkin thought much about how the powers of the internet affect the
accessibility and visibility of pornography. Perhaps he simply never reconsidered the
question after 1981. In any case, the question demands being reconsidered if one finds
Dworkin’s liberal principles compelling. Even if prohibiting online pornography is, from
a practical perspective, logistically impossible, the question of the right to pornography is
important because (hopefully) it demonstrates that technological development in general,
and the internet in particular, is a sharp and double-edged sword. If the internet can
amplify the ethical impact of certain behaviors to such a level that it threatens peoples’
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real ability to pursue a good life, a laissez-faire attitude is unacceptable. Does
Dworkinian liberalism, then, address the effect internet technology has on pornography
consumption?
The right to ethical independence, Dworkin thinks, entails that some kinds of
restrictions on the public displays of pornography succeed in showing equal concern, at
or least do not violate it, and so it makes sense to wonder whether the same applies to
digital pornography. What, exactly, is pornography? There seems to be a clear difference
between the nudity present in Michelangelo’s David and Kim Kardashian’s sex tape, but
an analytic definition of pornography proves elusive. However, as Ludwig Wittgenstein
noted, “the question of a word’s meaning so often obscures its use,” and so this thesis
follows the recommendation of Justice Potter Stewart’s opinion in Jacobellis vs. Ohio:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"], and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it…61
The question at hand is not “What is pornography,” and the question of whether a liberal
government may legitimately ban pornography does not depend on the existence of a
perfect definition of ‘pornography.’ Indeed, many laws that govern liberal communities
employ concepts with fuzzy borders. Liberal communities rightly penalize those that
drive under the influence and consequently injure other motorists in spite of the fact that
the precise meaning of “gross negligence” is unclear. For the purposes of this thesis, the
most helpful definition of pornography stipulates merely that pornography appeals
primarily to prurient interests, as opposed to artistic or otherwise, and whether not some
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film or picture counts as ‘pornography’ will have to be determined on a case-by-case
basis accordingly.
What is the apparent danger of pornography? As Robert George notes, “It is often
supposed – particularly by judges who would invalidate anti-pornography laws – that the
‘harm’ of pornography is offense to the sensibilities of those – like themselves, the judges
are quick to add – who find it distasteful.”62 On the contrary, the threat of pornography
lies in its “tendency to corrupt and deprave.”63 As Dworkin notes,
For the offense in question is not simply offense to the majority's aesthetic tastes,
like the offense people might find in a pink house in Belgravia. The offense is
freighted with moral convictions, particularly with convictions about what kinds
of sights are indecent rather than simply regrettable in the public space.64
The sexual appeal inherent in visual nature of pornography makes viewing it
extremely attractive. Humans are naturally sexually attracted to one another, and
pornography appeals to that prurient interest, often perhaps against the consciously-held
sexual ideals of its viewers. From this perspective, viewing pornography is merely a
means to the end of sexual pleasure, one that is seductively exempt from the messiness of
normal human interaction. Irrespective of the ethical value someone assigns to
pornography, it is the sheer convenience of viewing pornography which tends to
‘corrupt.’ Pornography is inherently appealing; it stimulates sexual desire in the viewer
and simultaneously exists as a means to fulfilling that desire, and it this combination
which many people find irresistible. In this respect, Dworkin asserts that it is possible that
availability of pornography will limit both “the ability of individuals consciously and
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reflectively to influence the conditions of their own and their children’s development”65
and “their ability to bring about the culture structure…in which sexual experience has
dignity and beauty, without which their own and their families’ sexual experience are
likely to have these qualities in less degree.”66 Where pornography is more highly
available, therefore, it might become increasingly difficult to choose the kinds of sex
lives we want.
In this respect, pornography diminishes one’s capacity to respond to judgements
of ethical value in sexual matters, to live well through one’s sexual preferences and
choices of behavior, whether or not they think that pornography is inherently bad for
them. On this view, the danger of pornography lies in the moral - not ethical - threat it
presents to second aspect of dignity, authenticity. Authenticity is threatened whenever
someone or something diminishes the “ability to consider the critical merits”67 of the
certain choice “in a reflective way,”68 the choice in question here being the choice to
critically incorporate viewing pornography into one’s conception of living well.
Accordingly, authenticity is threatened whenever the possibility of genuine endorsement
of one’s own life is threatened, and the widespread availability of pornography can only
be understood as increasing this threat. This is not to suggest that viewing pornography
never contributes to someone’s having lived well, for critically considering the merits of
viewing pornography is certainly possible. Rather, it is to say that for many people
pornography inherently frustrates their responsibility to live authentically, and they live
less well because of it; it can become something like an addiction as pornography
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continually frustrates their capacity to live well by all the while appealing to their prurient
interests against their critical interests. On this account, they lead sex lives they would not
have chosen. As Dworkin says, if someone “never endorses the life he leads as superior
to the life he would otherwise have led,” he has failed to meet the responsibility to live in
response to his own ethical judgements and therefore does not live well on this account.
How large is the audience for internet pornography? How much pornographic
material is online, and how often is it viewed? According to statistics published by
Pornhub, the world’s largest pornography website, pornhub.com alone received an
average of 92 million daily visits. Just in 2018, approximately 115 years’ worth of new
pornographic videos were uploaded to Pornhub; at 12,700,800 GB per day, more data is
transferred between Pornhub’s servers and viewers than the entire internet consumed in
2002. According to Pornhub’s “2018 Year in Review,” every minute
63,992 new visitors arrive at Pornhub, 207,405 videos are watched, and 57,750
searches are performed… 12 new videos and 2 hours of content are uploaded to
Pornhub every minute while 7708 Gigabytes of data are transferred worldwide.
Pornhub’s users view 13,962 profiles, follow 593 other users, accept 167 friend
requests and send 122 messages. 271 videos are rated, 528 are added to playlists
and 22 new comments are left.69
It shouldn’t be a surprise, then, that interviews given by officials at major search engine
companies estimate that between 10-15% of all internet searches are pornographyrelated70. No conceivably possible increase in the number of brick-and-mortar
pornography shops or lifting of restrictions on public display could make pornography
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more accessible than it is in virtue of power of internet technology. Whether or not
overall porn consumption has risen between “Is There A Moral Right to Pornography?”
and now, the advent of the internet has almost certainly made pornography more
accessible than ever before. The magnitude of the moral danger of pornography is
directly related to its availability, as Dworkin acknowledges, and so it remains to
consider whether it is plausible to think that arguments endorsing restrictions on public
display might also apply to the internet in a manner consistent with liberal principles.
For a great many people in liberal communities, internet use dominates their daily
activities and endeavors. Through the internet we engage in political discourse, run
businesses, order groceries and even pharmaceuticals; social media is one of the primary
avenues for social engagement and the main outlet for news sources. The internet is so
thoroughly integrated into nearly every quintessentially human activity that living a life
without dependence on internet technology is, all things considered, more difficult than
not. The amount of relative inconveniences and disadvantages someone incurs at refusing
to use the internet is not insignificant, and as technology progresses, it is reasonable to
think that internet use will be further integrated into more and more fundamental human
activities as the opportunity cost of staying disconnected increases. In these
circumstances, it makes sense to suppose that the internet is a kind of public space subject
to certain kinds of restrictions.
The reply that people who dislike pornography in this way should just “not look
for pornography online” is to misunderstand Dworkin’s original argument and understate
the degree to which most people depend upon constant internet access in their essential
day-to-day activities. The right to ethical independence protects against political action
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that implicitly judges some kinds of lives as better than others or treats certain kinds of
people as if they matter less than others, but in the case of pornography, Dworkin claims
it also recommends restrictions on public display of pornography as a “compromise.”71
Banning something simply because it is wrong and banning something because it tends to
diminish the real capacity to live well are not the same, and prohibiting online
pornography is not the same as prohibiting pornography entirely. Dworkin asserts that
insofar as the justification for restriction of pornography access is of the latter sort, those
members of the political community deserve to have their preferences counted. That the
primary means of viewing pornography has merely shifted from physical stores to the
internet gives no reason to think that the right to ethical independence recommends any
less of compromise, especially where the perceived threat of pornography to living well
is greatly increased by internet technology.
If anything, a political majority that considers the availability of pornography a
threat to living well likely has a stronger claim today than they did when Dworkin first
considered a possible right to pornography. In this sense, the right to ethical
independence makes limited recommendations. Firstly, it is implausible to think that the
right to ethical independence justifies a total prohibition of all forms of pornography. The
corrupting moral danger of public displays and online pornography is not present when
someone reads Playboy in private, for instance, and so the right to ethical independence
cannot serve as grounds to justify total prohibition in this case. However, neither is the
right to ethical independence threatened nor the responsibility to show equal concern
abdicated when a political majority that considers the online availability of pornography
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as a serious threat to living well and moves to prohibit it on this account. Such a
justification does not depend on an illegitimate ethical judgement about either would-be
pornography viewers or the kinds of sexual behaviors depicted in pornographic works.
Hence, a Dworkinian liberal community can be justified in prohibiting online
pornography in the same manner as public displays. Though they may make an implicit
ethical judgement in doing so, the right to ethical independence is not threatened when
the preference for online prohibition is justified by ethical self-protection, rather than
ethical disapproval. This is not to say, however, that from Dworkinian principles it
follows that liberal communities should prohibit online pornography, rather that it is
politically possible for a Dworkinian liberal community to do so. Where objectively
attractive liberalisms must be sensitive to the right and the good together, it should be no
surprise a technology as powerful and far-reaching as the internet might demand
regulation in accordance with liberal values. Liberal justice concerns morality, what we
owe other people as members of a political community. Therefore, a contemporary liberal
community seeking to protect the value of living well, personal autonomy, and dignity
might do well to begin addressing the challenges to pursuing a good life implicit in
internet technology by prohibiting online pornography.
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